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Measuring the Tax Subsidy in Private Equity




It is unusual for a legal academic to be the subject of a profile in the
New York Times. Even more so for a tax professor. But the issue of the
taxation of private equity and hedge fund managers is hot. Having
written the first paper on the topic,' Professor Victor Fleischer has
become something of a celebrity And the issue of whether the tax
advantages enjoyed by private equity and hedge fund managers are fair
has become front-page news.
Beginning in earnest in the Spring of 2007, driven by both the
announcement of the impending IPO by the Blackstone Group,3 a
leading private equity group, and the ongoing reports of billion dollar
hedge fund profits, the media picked up the story of what one headline
* Copyright © 2o08 by Thomas J. Brennan and Karl S. Okamoto. The Authors are indebted to
Roger Dennis, Victor Fleischer, Michael Knoll, Andrew Lo, and David Weisbach for their comments
and suggestions. We also benefited from the comments of participants at the Second Annual Law &
Entrepreneurship Retreat held at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law on March
7, 2008 (particularly those of Vic Fleischer, our discussant), and at the Twelfth Annual European
Conference of the Financial Management Association International held in Prague, Czech Republic on
June 4-6, 2008 (particularly those of Professor James Kolari, our discussant). The usual disclaimers
apply.
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i. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. i, I (2008).
2. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Professor's Word on a Buyout Tax Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2007, § Bus., at 8 (asking Professor Fleischer "about the whirlwind his paper had caused"), available at
http:llwww.nytimes.com/2oo7/to/o3/business/o3tax.html.
3. See Michael J. de la Merced, Blackstone to Set a Stock Offering Price Sooner than Expected,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at C2 (noting Congressional reaction to Blackstone IPO).
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called The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity.4 Although there are
several different tax issues that have been raised,5 one has stood out for
attention-the preferential taxation of the carried interest or
performance fees earned by these investment professionals. As one
commentator put it, "[tihe backlash against the tremendous wealth being
created by managers of hedge funds and private equity funds may be
gaining strength."
6
That backlash has led to proposed legislation7 to eliminate at least
one aspect of the tax advantage-the taxation of carried interest at the
lower long-term capital gains rate.8 These bills have led to public
hearings9 and substantial commentary on both sides of the issue.'" They
have also engendered a growing number of academic studies."
4. Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private-Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, § Bus.,
at 4 (arguing that preferential taxation of carried interest is not sound economic policy), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/IO/03/business/o3tax.html.
5. In addition to the capital gains treatment of carried interest and the deferral available for
both carried interest and performance fees, commentators have questioned the ability of publicly-
traded partnerships like the Blackstone Group to avoid the payment of corporate-level taxes. This was
the primary focus of the legislation proposed by members of the Senate Finance Committee. See, e.g.,
Stephen Joyce, Baucus, Grassley Introduce Measure to Tax Traded Partnerships Similar to
Corporations, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, June 15, 2007, at G-5 (reporting on the
introduction of S. 1624). The legislation proposed by three Democratic members of the House went
further to specifically address the issue of the tax rate on carried interest payments. See Brett
Ferguson, House Democrats Target Fund Managers With Bill to Raise Taxes on Carried Interest, BNA
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, June 25, 2007, at G-9 (reporting on the introduction of H.R. 2834).
Blackstone's use of good will depreciation has also drawn criticism. See David Cay Johnston, Tax
Loopholes Sweeten a Deal for Blackstone, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at Ai.
6. Jenny Anderson, Scrutiny on Tax Rates That Fund Managers Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2007,
at C3.
7. H.R. 2834, sioth Cong. (2007); S. 1624, 11oth Cong. (2o07).
8. Commentators, including members of Congress, are often not very careful to distinguish
between the "carried interest" earned by private equity managers and the "performance fee" earned
by hedge fund managers. See, e.g., Sen. Baucus Opening Remarks for Senate Finance Committee
Hearing on Taxation of Carried Interest, 7 BNA TAXCORE, July I 1, 2007, at 133-34 (July 11, 2007). As
we discuss below, there are important differences in the two types of compensation. See discussion
infra Part I and accompanying notes.
9. Carried Interest Part : Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Finance, Iioth Cong. (2oo7); Carried
Interest Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Finance, Iioth Cong. (2007); Carried Interest Part III:
Pension Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Finance, rloth Cong. (2007); Hearing on Fair and
Equitable Tax Policy for America's Working Families Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, iioth
Cong. (2007).
io. For example, the two presidential candidates have taken opposing positions on the taxation of
carried interest. See ROBERT WILLIAMS & HOWARD GLECKMAN, URBAN INSTITUTE, AN UPDATED
ANALYSIS OF THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' TAX PLANS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE AUGUST 15,
2008 ANALYSIS I (2008), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/uploadedpdf/41175oupdated-
candidates-summary.pdf. The opposing positions were typified by the testimony before Congress in
connection with the aforementioned hearings. H.R. 2834 (2007); S. 1624 (2007). An Internet search for
"taxation carried interest" will bring hundreds of references to the discussion on both sides of the
issue.
ii. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note I, at 49-50 (concluding that the status quo treatment of a
profits interest in a partnership is no longer a tenable position to take as a matter of sound tax policy);
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This Article offers a new analysis of the subject. Our goal is to
provide an analytical model that allows us to measure the relative
benefits currently enjoyed by private equity and hedge fund managers
and other managerial types, such as corporate executives and
entrepreneurs. We look to "relative benefits" in order to determine the
extent to which the current state of the world favors the services of a
private equity or hedge fund manager over these other workers. Our
conclusion is that private equity and hedge fund managers do outperform
other workers on a risk-adjusted, after-tax basis. In the case of hedge
fund managers, this superiority persists even after the preferential tax
treatment is eliminated, suggesting that taxes alone do not provide a
complete explanation. We assume that, over time, compensation of
private equity and hedge fund managers should approach equilibrium on
a risk-adjusted basis with other comparable compensation opportunities.
In the meantime, however, our model suggests that differences in tax
account for a substantial portion of the disjuncture that exists at the
moment. We thus find that the current state of the world provides a
meaningful incentive for workers to pursue careers as private fund
managers, relative to other careers as corporate managers,
entrepreneurs, and ordinary wage earnings, and that a significant portion
of this incentive is created by the current preferential tax treatment.
It is not our purpose to suggest that a change in the tax treatment of
hedge fund or private equity fund manager compensation would be good
policy. 2 That is a much more complicated question than the one we seek
to answer. Nevertheless, we believe this analysis is important. It provides
a perspective on the current issue that has so far been ignored. 3 It
answers the question of how taxation affects behavior in the market for
allocating human capital. It also provides quantitative precision to the
current debate. On each side, advocates rely on loosely drawn analogies
between fund managers on the one hand, and entrepreneurs and
corporate executives on the other, to argue that similar tax treatments
see also Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with
Profit Shares. What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1071 (2oo8); David A. Weisbach, The
Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715, 716-20 (2008); Michael S. Knoll,
The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit
Interests as Ordinary Income I (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law and Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
07-20), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=IO07774; Note, Taxing Private Equity Carried Interest
Using an Incentive Stock Option Analogy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 846,846-47 (2OO8).
12. It may well be that a subsidy is good policy because, for example, an investment by society in
alternative asset management leads to greater economic growth. Our goal is simply to provide a
quantitative analysis to inform the discussion.
13. With the exception of one editorial by the economist, Robert Frank, taking a perspective
similar to ours. Robert H. Frank, Editorial, A Career in Hedge Funds and the Price of Overcrowding,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2O07, at C3 ("By making the after-tax rewards in the investment industry a little
less spectacular, the proposed legislation would raise the attractiveness of other career paths, ones in
which extra talent would yield substantial gains.").
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are or are not justified.'4 We simply seek to provide the mathematics that
these comparisons imply.
We assume that much of the current public debate over the taxation
of private investment managers is based upon a logic that does not
necessarily rely on rigorous analysis. Government has a persistent need
to raise revenues while facing the perils of voter displeasure over any
attempt to increase taxes. Therefore, being realists about tax politics, we
are not surprised that members of Congress would show initial
enthusiasm for a tax increase that is focused on a population that is both
small and notorious for its extraordinary wealth. Until the campaign
finance implications are fully understood (the private investment
industry is a significant source of political contributions)'5 , it must be
difficult for a legislator to resist the allure of a potentially significant
revenue source that might be tapped while spouting a populist rhetoric
demonizing the already much-distrusted titans of Wall Street.'6 After all,
is it not true that these congressmen are simply proposing that the super-
rich pay the same taxes as we all do?
As compelling as this simple "fairness" argument might seem on its
face, Congress has discovered that the issue is more complex.'7 Not only
has the industry lobby reminded many politicians on both sides of the
aisle of their fundraising power,'8 but also genuine issues of good policy
have been raised. When examining tax policy, two fundamental issues
must be addressed. First, since taxes serve society by raising revenues for
governmental activity while imposing a cost on private transactions, tax
choices must be evaluated by weighing the potential revenue to be
generated for government and the potential costs imposed, including any
14. See, e.g., Sanchirico, supra note II, at 1078-79, 1134-35; Weisbach, supra note II, at 717-I8
(discussing the alternative analogies used to argue over the appropriate tax treatment of carried
interests); Private Equity Council, Private Equity and the Treatment of Carried Interest:
An Overview, http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/public-policy/legislative/private-equity-funds-tax-
treatment-of-carried-interests/ (last visited Nov. 13, 20o8) ("The justification for a reduced tax rate for
long-term capital gains is based on the concept of entrepreneurial investment."). The Private Equity
Council is the principal trade association for the private equity industry. It sponsored the research that
lead to Professor Weisbach's article. Weisbach, supra note II, at 715 n.*.
15. See, e.g., Nicholas Rummell, Private Equity and Hedge Funds Work Both Sides of the Aisle,
FIN. WEEK, Sept. I, 2008, at 3, 20, available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/2oo8o9oi/REG/3o9o19978.
I6. See, e.g., Robin Toner, A New Populism Spurs Democrats on the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 2007, at AI.
17. Editorial, Too Timid for Tax Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. I, 2007, at A3o ("A spokesman for
the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid, told The Post that time appeared to have run out to act this
year and that, in any event, the issue needs more study.").
I8. Id. ("That decision has all the signs of a delaying tactic to avoid raising taxes on an industry
that is a heavy campaign contributor."); Associated Press, Private Equity Warns Against Raising Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at C2 ("Though private equity groups and hedge funds could be tempting
targets for lawmakers looking to pay for new federal programs, the industry has been lobbying
aggressively against the tax increase and crucial senators appear to be listening.").
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secondary costs beyond the tax itself. Thus we discuss the merits of tax
proposals by comparing the revenue opportunity with the cost to tax
payers and to the economy as a whole. If a tax is likely to impact
economic growth adversely, for example, that cost must also be weighed.
Some commentators have raised the issue of whether the revenue
opportunity in changing the way we tax private investment managers is
as great as perceived,'9 and whether the complexity and spillover costs of
any change doesn't outweigh the value of the tax."0 These questions
certainly need to be answered before Congress can make an intelligent
choice on the issue.
There is, however, another fundamental question which should not
be forgotten in the debate. When taxation creates differences between
similar economic activities, we realize that incentives may be affected. A
lower tax on one activity may be fairly described as a subsidy, since the
lower tax cost favors one activity over another. We thus focus on a
fundamental question: does the current tax regime favor one form of
managerial activity-hedge fund manager, private equity fund manager,
corporate manager or entrepreneur-over another? If yes, which over
which and by how much? Our goal is to add to the current debate by
comparing the "subsidy" the current tax regime offers to private
investment managers relative to wage earners, entrepreneurs and
corporate executives. Our premise is that if we can offer a relative
measure-i.e., an ability to see the impact of taxes on manager
economics in the private equity and hedge fund industries relative to
comparable impacts on wage earners, entrepreneurs and corporate
executives-we will then have a tool for a more analytical discussion of
the issue.
To meet this goal, we provide a methodology for comparing the tax
subsidy that a tax regime offers under various managerial compensation
arrangements. To construct the model, we treat two cases-wage earners
and entrepreneurs-as benchmarks, or given values in our tax system,
against which each of the other types and their treatment by the tax law
can be compared. We then analyze each of the other types-corporate
executives, private equity fund managers, and hedge fund managers-to
determine where their compensation arrangements and treatment under
the tax law fall in relation to the benchmarks. To make this comparison
meaningful, we construct a model that reduces each type of
19. Professor Knoll has calculated the potential tax revenues that would come from changing the
tax treatment of private equity carried interests at an estimated two to three billion dollars per year.
See Knoll, supra note I1, at 12-13. He also predicts that much of that gain will be eliminated as private
equity funds restructure in order to ameliorate the effect of any change. Id. at 14.
20. Professor Weisbach concludes that any attempt to change the partnership tax rules, which
give rise to the preferential treatment of carried interest, "will be complex and easily avoidable rules
that raise little revenue while imposing excessive compliance costs." Weisbach, supra note i I, at 719.
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compensation arrangement into a set of common variables, allowing us
to calculate the relative values of each arrangement and the relative
impact of taxes.
Before turning to our model, we should address a significant possible
objection to our premise. Professor Chris Sanchirico has made the point
that the only tax advantage enjoyed by private equity fund managers
stems from a "joint tax arbitrage," and not simply from availability of
deferral or long-term capital gains treatment.' He rightly makes the
point that taxes must be viewed from an "all parties" or "joint tax"
perspective." Under this approach, we cannot evaluate the tax benefits
made available to private equity fund managers without evaluating the
cost of those benefits to other involved parties, such as the private equity
fund's investors. Professor Sanchirico rightly concludes that absent a
difference in tax rate spreads among the parties to a fund, there would be
no net tax savings, since any tax savings given to the manager would be
offset by the lost deduction available to the investors in the fund.23 A
similar "closed system" critique can be made regarding the use of
deferral by hedge fund managers. 4
Professor Sanchirico suggests that this perspective on the issue leads
to the conclusion that "the tax treatment of profits interest comes to
seem like something of a red herring." 5 His colleague, Professor Michael
Knoll, uses a similar "joint tax" analysis to conclude that the net revenue
opportunity from changing the taxation of carried interests is likely to be
small.26 Both acknowledge that a joint tax arbitrage opportunity does in
fact exist in the private equity industry.27 The dominance of tax-exempts
as investors in private equity funds is an important part of the tax story. 8
Tax-exempts like universities and public pension plans do not "pay" for
the tax benefits given to fund managers because, as non-tax payers, they
do not bear the "loss" of the offsetting deductions. Professor Sanchirico
21. Sanchirico, supra note iH, at 1076 ("[Tlhe Article's main point is that the tax
advantage.., is... a form of 'joint tax arbitrage."').
22. Id. at 1077-78.
23. Id. at 1076.
24. "Lost" tax revenues from deferred compensation are matched by the "lost" tax deduction
that would have otherwise been available to the investors in the funds, and vice versa. Id.
25. Id. at 1o82.
26. Knoll, supra note i s, at 5-7.
27. Knoll, supra note i I, at 14; Sanchirico, supra note i i, at 1076.
28. Offshore investors play a similar role in hedge funds. They do not pay U.S. taxes and
therefore do not value the lost deduction for compensation expense. See 26 U.S.C. § 864(b) (2006).
Under section 86 4 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, trade in stocks, securities, and commodities
through a resident agent does not amount to the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States by a foreign principal. Thus, if a foreign individual invests in a hedge fund structured as a U.S.
partnership but has no other connections with the United States, and if the hedge fund engages
exclusively in transactions qualifying under section 864 (b), then the foreign individual will not be
subject to U.S. income taxation.
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sees this fact as making the discussion more "complicated" since we may
well feel differently about the tax advantage if we see it as benefiting
universities and public pensions rather than Wall Street tycoons.29
Professor Knoll predicts that any change in tax treatment would simply
cause a shift in investor base from tax-exempts to high net-worth
individuals. ° Implicit in both assessments is the assumption that
equilibrium exists between the fund manager and the fund investors. In
equilibrium any change in the net, after-tax value of the manager
compensation will result in a shift. Presumably, the argument goes, if
asked to pay a larger tax bill, fund managers will seek greater pre-tax
compensation. Therefore the only "subsidy" arising from the tax
arbitrage is paid to tax-exempts who pay less in manager compensation
than they otherwise would. If this is the case, can we even speak of a tax
"subsidy" for the managers? If managers are being paid what the market
requires and taxes are providing no net savings other than to the extent
they allow tax-exempts some reduced cost, isn't it true that this whole
controversy is but a "red herring" or simply sour grapes over private
fund managers' enormous paydays?
Perhaps, but consider the possibility that in the real world
equilibrium is often elusive, and that it may well be that private equity
and hedge fund managers have been enjoying "above market" rewards
for their services.' If in fact investors do not possess the power to
"bargain away" the joint tax arbitrage that may exist, then the tax law
may be providing not only a subsidy but indeed a windfall. In such a
world, private equity and hedge fund managers would enjoy risk-
adjusted returns that exceed those of other managers by even more than
the effect of taxes. In this world, it might be that fund mangers, already
able to command "non-market" compensation from their investors, are
simply allowed to pocket the found money of lower taxes. This is the
story that is consistent with our findings.
We say "consistent," not "proven." We do not have evidence of
market failure in the bargain between private fund managers and their
investors.32 We did not look for it. Instead, we developed a model that
29. Sanchirico, supra note I1, at 1152.
3
o
. Knoll, supra note ii, at 14.
3 1. Professor Sanchirico has not ignored this possibility, but asserts that any disequilibrium is not
best addressed as a tax issue. Sanchirico, supra note i i, at 1151. We tend to agree, but nevertheless see
value in developing our model as an analytical tool.
32. Two observations may be of interest. First, in the Authors' experience, hedge fund managers
limit their use of "deferral" to their off-shore funds. This suggests that they hesitate to impose the
"cost" of deferral on those of their investors who may value the current deduction of management fee
expenses, and take advantage of the tax planning opportunity only where it is costless to their
investors. Any suggestion that this implies that the tax opportunity provides "excess" returns begs the
question of why offshore and tax-exempt investors do not bargain for their share in providing this
opportunity. One theory that is consistent with our experience is that individual investors simply do
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provides a comparison of the risk-adjusted returns available to five types
of compensation-private equity fund manager, hedge fund manager,
corporate executive, entrepreneur, and wage earner. By enabling us to
compare on an "apples to apples" basis, adjusting for the differing
structures of their compensation and the differing levels of risk,33 the
model allows us to suggest that private fund managers enjoy excess
returns for their labor and that a portion of that excess comes in the form
of preferential tax treatment.
To reach this conclusion, we must make a critical normative
assumption-one with which many will disagree.34 We must assume that
the risk/reward opportunity available to a wage earner and the
risk/reward opportunity available to the entrepreneur35  serve as
benchmarks for our analysis. We can compare any two points in our data
not think this way, at least not yet, about the terms of their investee funds. They focus on the net
returns offered at the fund level. In order to effectively bargain for their "share" of the value of the
deferral opportunity, hedge fund investors would first need to understand the potential value from a
total portfolio perspective (and in their case insert structures that allow them to capture some of the
value) and then overcome the collective action problems inherent in seeking to change industry terms
necessary to capture a share. This same "fund level, net returns" focus is also common among the
much more developed and mature investor community in private equity. Here lies our second
observation. Because private equity funds are essentially liquidating partnerships, cash flows tend to
be fairly well matched. So, investors receive cash at roughly the same time as they "book" taxable
gains. We would suggest that the appetite of investors to revisit the "sharing" of tax benefits would be
voracious if this were not true. If investors had to fund cash taxes before they received cash returns
because of the taxation of carried interests, this would change. But because there is this match of cash
flows, investors simply focus on their net after-tax returns. The "cost" of deferring the deduction for
the management fees and the carried interest paid to the fund manager is never made evident, leading
fund investors to view the "tax benefit" paid to the managers as "costless" to them and outside the
economics of the fund. As Professors Knoll and Sanchirico demonstrate, they are wrong. Knoll, supra
note is, at 11-15; Sanchirico, supra note iI, at 1076-77. But it is instructive to see how the negotiations
over the carried interest and its structure changes when one compares a "captive fund," such as the
private equity arm of a large financial institution or family office and a stand-alone private equity
limited partnership. In the captive context, the tax benefits of carry are very much on the table. Not so
in the traditional partnership structure. We see this as anecdotal evidence of disequilibrium, at least
for the time being.
33. Professor Sanchirico does make passing reference to the issue of risk in comparing types of
activities. He argues that risk is not a basis for distinguishing labor from capital returns. See Sanchirico,
supra note I I, at 1152-53. We agree. However, as asset pricing theory informs us, differing risk is a
basis for modeling, and ultimately comparing, differing financial "streams," whether they stem from
"sweat" or money. See generally Zvi BODIE Er AL., INVESTMENTS (8th ed. 2009) (outlining the
importance of risk in comparing asset returns and forming portfolios).
34. Professor Sanchirico makes the point that horizontal equity "analysis is plagued with many
serious problems." Sanchirico, supra note it, at t146. We agree, and do not want to suggest we are
doing anything more than adding some analytical tools for the larger, more complex normative
discussion.
35. As will become clear in our choice of modeling inputs, we define entrepreneur to include only
that very narrow subset of self-employed persons who are able to attract venture capital financing for
their businesses. The concept of "entrepreneur" is often seen to include a much larger universe of
activities. See generally SHANE A. ScoTT, THE ILLUSIONS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2-3 (2008) (defining
entrepreneur in several different ways).
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to illustrate the differing risk and reward profiles. But in order to make
an assertion that any one point is superior or inferior to another, we need
to have defined a frontier-a relationship between two points that
demarcates the targeted trade-off between risk and reward. By setting
our benchmarks as the wage earner and the entrepreneur, and by
defining our frontier as a portfolio of wage earner and entrepreneur
compensation, we are able to establish what we call a "policy line."
The wage earner is the archetype of one kind of tax treatment of
compensation-ordinary income. The entrepreneur is the archetype for
the other -deferred long-term capital gains. Our primary justification for
using them as benchmarks is simply that so many others do. As we've
noted already, much of the discussion of the taxation of private fund
managers relies on analogies to these types. 6 More fundamentally,
however, we also believe that notions regarding the benefits of
entrepreneurship and new business formation (as well as the value of
capital versus labor, as Professor Sanchirico has suggested37) are
important forces within tax policy. They do in fact define a frontier that
reflects policy assumptions. While we leave for another day the much
broader question of whether a tax Freference for various kinds of
entrepreneurial activity is good policy,3 it is useful to begin an analysis of
how taxes may favor one activity over another by setting up a model that
allows us to compare them to the one activity many already assume is to
be favored. If nothing else, our discovery that private fund managers
enjoy an even greater benefit than entrepreneurs (and wage earners and
corporate executives as well) raises the question of whether that is what
we really want.
Again, it may be true that taxes have little impact on what the
reward is for taking the risk of becoming a private fund manager. We
assume that over time, they probably will not. But if it is possible, as we
suspect, that equilibrium has not yet been reached and that it may well
take time for it to be achieved, it is at least interesting to know that
36. See sources cited supra note 14.
37. Sanchirico, supra note i i, at 1148-49 (noting that limiting a horizontal equity discussion to the
differing tax treatments of labor returns ignores the issue of how returns on endowments, such as gifts
and inheritance, may also benefit from preferences).
38. Professor Sanchirico expresses some skepticism. Sanchirico, supra note ii, at 1137 (noting
that the "sweat equity" analogy is inapt). Our analysis agrees with his conclusion as it regards the
taxation of carried interests. We also agree more generally that the "sweat equity" concept needs
unpacking for proper analysis. The kind of "entrepreneur" Professor Sanchirico seems to have in mind
in his discussion sounds more like the self-employed small business person than the venture capital-
backed high-technology executive. Our initial suspicion is that the latter may be the one case where
the usual rhetoric around "sweat equity" may make sense. See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer,
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116
HARV. L. REV. 874, 889-96 (2103) (discussing the "tax subsidy" available in structuring management
incentives in venture capital companies). Our current project is a taxonomy (excuse the pun) of
various compensation structures that live behind the "entrepreneur" label.
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private equity fund managers enjoy a compound average after-tax
return39 that is 8.2 percentage points higher per year, and that hedge fund
managers enjoy an even higher 24.1 percentage points advantage, in each
case relative to the risk-adjusted reward available to other workers.
Interestingly, we find that taxes may account for 93%, or nearly the full
amount, of the excess returns enjoyed by private equity managers, and as
much as 20% of the excess returns enjoyed by hedge fund managers.
I. MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION: THE TYPES
A. THE BENCHMARK TYPES
The basic story of the taxation of compensation (returns on human
capital) is that compensation (such as wages) is ordinary income, and is
taxed at ordinary income rates (we use 35% for our illustrations)4" as
soon as it is earned (meaning when received). This is in contrast to the
taxation of capital gains (returns on financial capital) which if held long-
term is taxed at lower capital gains rates (we use i5% for our
illustrations).' We call this basic story the "wage earner" type.
In contrast to the wage earner, the "entrepreneur" receives a
significant portion of her compensation through an equity investment in
her firm. This "choice" of stock over cash is often driven by the nature of
an entrepreneurial or "start-up" venture. First, cash is often quite limited
in an early-stage company. Second, investors in early-stage companies
typically insist that management have a substantial personal stake in the
success of a company as a way of both ensuring their commitment to the
venture and testing their belief in its potential. 2 Finally, because of this
belief, entrepreneurs commonly seek the perceived high return potential
of an equity position in lieu of cash compensation. Because society seeks
to encourage entrepreneurial activity, when an entrepreneur takes a
significant portion of her return on her human capital-her
compensation-in the form of an ownership interest in the firm being
established (commonly called "founders' stock"), the U.S. tax regime
rewards entrepreneurial activity with preferential tax treatment.43
39. For a discussion of how we make these calculations, see infra notes 97-102 and accompanying
text.
40. See 26 U.S.C. § I(i)(2) (2oo6) (specifying that 35% is the current maximum rate generally
applicable to ordinary income).
41. See 26 U.S.C. § I(h)(I)(C) (2oo6) (specifying that 15% is the current maximum rate generally
applicable to long term capital gains).
42. See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 38, at 88o-8i.
43. See, e.g., Julie B. Cullen & Roger H. Gordon, Taxes and Entrepreneurial Activity: Theory and
Evidence for the U.S. i (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9015, 2002) ("Given
[the] positive spillovers generated by entrepreneurial activity, there are clear reasons to try to
subsidize such activity through the tax system.").
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The preferential treatment stems from the tax treatment of the
founders' stock. If at the time of its founding a newly-formed company
issued equity to its founding CEO for a nominal sum, there would be no
tax event.' Indeed we would treat the entrepreneur as a capitalist, even
though we all understand that she forwent future cash compensation in
exchange for her equity stake. If she holds her stake for at least a year"
and she sells it for $io million, she would be taxed at the long-term
capital gains rate. So having "earned" a $io million reward for her efforts
in building and growing the firm, she pays taxes in the amount of $1.5
million (the 15% long-term capital gains rate) rather than $3.5 million
(the 35% ordinary income rate). Because she was there at the beginning
and chose to convert her "sweat into equity" the tax rules give her a $2
million benefit, and allow her to accumulate her reward without paying
tax along the way. Because our wage earner does not make the same
"investment" in his firm, the tax law does not accord him the same
opportunity. Indeed, the tax law does not offer the same opportunity to
the executive who converts her sweat into equity at a more mature
company. While the corporate executive is given the chance to take
equity on a tax deferred basis, in the end she must pay tax on both the
value of the grant, and the value of any growth she oversees, as ordinary
income. 6
Our analysis sees these two types-wage earner and entrepreneur-
as extreme points that define a frontier. The wage earner is the low-risk
alternative for which there is no tax subsidy. The entrepreneur is the
highest-risk option for which the tax law provides a subsidy in allowing
both tax-deferred accumulation and a lower capital gains rate upon
realization. The frontier is the line between these two extremes, formed
as one substitutes an increasing amount of entrepreneur compensation
for wage-earner compensation. The interesting results come from seeing
where the other types fall in relation to this frontier.
B. HEDGE FUND MANAGER
A hedge fund manager is one or more investment professionals,
usually organized as an entity of some kind, such as a limited liability
company, who engages in the business of managing a pool of capital,
investing typically in liquid securities markets like equities, commodities
or related derivatives.47 The insertion of an entity is largely irrelevant for
44. We are ignoring the risk of being assessed for any amount of original issue discount. See
generally JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
TRANSACTIONS 202, at 2-9 to 2-26 (2oo8) (discussing tax structuring options for equity investment by
the entrepreneur).
45. Id. 202.3.7, at 2-22.
46. See id. 4o8, at 4-46 to 4-56.
47. See generally FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, THE HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 1-50 (2006)
(providing background on the nature of hedge funds and their compensation structures).
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our discussion since routinely the entities used 'are "pass through"
entities for tax purposes and most of the compensation we are examining
is in any event "passed through" to individuals as salary and bonus. So,
for our purposes, it is both valid and simpler to think of a hedge fund
manager as an individual. The analysis applies equally well whether or
not the manager actually consists of a one-man sole proprietorship or a
limited liability company employing hundreds of highly compensated
investment professionals.
The pool of capital known as the "hedge fund" is typically organized
as a limited partnership-style entity (such as a Delaware limited
partnership or Cayman Islands share company), and obtains its capital
from sophisticated investors such as high net worth families, pension
funds, and endowments. The hedge fund manager enters into an advisory
agreement with the hedge fund pursuant to which the fund grants to the
manager investment discretion over its capital. As compensation for its
investment management services, the hedge fund manager is typically
provided both a "management fee" and a "performance fee." The
industry standard (although often negotiated up or down in individual
cases) is known as "two and twenty," meaning that the hedge fund
manager receives a management fee of 2% of the assets under
management and a performance fee equal to 20% of the profits earned
by the fund during a given (usually annual) period. 8
To use a simple example of a "two and twenty" arrangement, if a
hedge fund manager manages a hedge fund with total assets under
management at the beginning of the year of $i billion and that fund
grows through its investment activity to $1.2 billion by year end (in other
words, experiences a 20% return for the year), the hedge fund manager
would be entitled to receive a management fee of around $22 million
(assuming average assets under management for the year of $i.i billion)
and a performance fee of $40 million. Each of these fees is treated as
compensation under U.S. tax law and, absent use of the deferred
compensation rules, would be taxable once earned as ordinary income.
Assuming operating expenses (other than compensation expense) of say
$5 million and applying an assumed tax rate of 35%, our hedge fund
manager would owe total taxes of just under $20 million (total revenue of
$62 million, less $5 million of expenses,49 leaving $57 million of pre-tax
income).
However, as has led to criticism of late, rarely do hedge fund
managers pay taxes immediately on the management and performance
48. See Fleischer, supra note i, at 3 (describing the industry standard of "2 and 20").
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 162 (2oo6) (allowing for a deduction from gross income for all ordinary and
necessary business expenses).
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fees they earn. Instead, they make use of the U.S. tax law's deferred
compensation rules. These rules allow managers (indeed technically just
about any earner of compensation) to elect to defer receipt of their
earnings and thereby postpone payment of any taxes.' We will discuss
the deferral rules in greater detail below. The opportunity to defer
compensation as a hedge fund manager offers an attractive benefit to the
industry by allowing hedge fund managers to effectively borrow from the
government at no cost the amount they would otherwise pay in tax if no
deferral were allowed. It also allows them to invest funds in their funds'
trading activities in a manner that avoids the current taxation of trading
profits that would otherwise be payable if they had simply invested after-
tax dollars in their own funds. In other words, the manager can
compound his investment tax-free. These two benefits of deferral for
hedge fund managers can be extraordinarily valuable, both absolutely
and relatively to other managers in other industries who may also have
an opportunity to defer compensation.
C. PRIVATE EQUITY FUND MANAGER
Like our hedge fund manager, a private equity fund manager is one
or more investment professionals, usually organized as an entity of some
kind such as a limited liability company, who engages in the business of
managing a pool of capital, investing typically in either control
investments in private companies or in venture capital opportunities."
Again, the insertion of an entity is largely irrelevant for our discussion
since routinely the entities used are "pass through" entities for tax
purposes and most of the compensation is "passed through" to
individuals as salary and bonus. So again we will think of a private equity
fund manager as an individual.
The pool of capital is known as the "private equity fund," is typically
organized as a limited partnership, and obtains its capital from
sophisticated investors such as high net worth families, pension funds and
endowments. Unlike a hedge fund, which deploys capital from its
investors relatively quickly in liquid market transactions, private equity
funds begin with "committed capital," which is drawn down over time as
transactions are identified and completed. A typical private equity fund
50. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Managers Use Hedge Funds as Big I.R.A.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2007, at AI.
51. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
52. See generally Guy FRASER-SAMPSON, PRIVATE EQUITY AS AN ASSET CLASS 15-42 (2007)
(discussing the background on the nature of private equity firms and their compensation structures);
JOSH LERNER Er AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 1-35 (4th ed. 2009) (same);
Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Fund 19-20 (Univ. of Pa.,
Wharton Sch., Dept. of Fin., Preliminary Draft, Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with author) (same). For a
complete discussion of the current tax law treatment of private equity fund compensation, see
Weisbach, supra note I I, at 727-33.
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will contemplate an investment period of five to seven years during
which committed capital can be called by the manager to fund individual
investments. Typically a private equity fund will contemplate a
harvesting of all of its portfolio investments within a ten to twelve year
period.
The private equity fund manager generally serves as the general
partner of the private equity fund and as such is given investment
discretion over its capital. As compensation for its investment
management services as the general partner of the fund, the private
equity fund manager is typically provided both a "management fee" and
a carried interest. Like with hedge funds, the industry standard (although
subject to negotiation up or down in individual cases) is "two and
twenty," meaning that the private equity fund manager receives a
management fee of 2% of the assets under management (generally
measured by reference to total committed capital) and a carried interest
equal to 20% of the profits earned by the fund during its total life.
It is important to highlight the key differences in the "two and
twenty" structure between hedge funds and private equity funds. First,
while analogous, the 20% performance fee paid by hedge fund investors
is quite different from the 20% carried interest paid by private equity
investors. In the hedge fund case, the fee is paid annually based upon
changes in value in the fund. In the private equity fund, the carried
interest is paid through the partnership's distribution waterfall, so is not
paid until actually realized. So, if in our hedge fund example the fund
were to suffer a 20% decline the following year, our hedge fund manager
would not be required to return the previous year's performance fee.
Often investors in the fund would have had the option to redeem their
investments to lock in any one period's profits, and therefore can fairly
be said to have started a new one-year investment management
relationship. But it is not necessarily true that a hedge fund investor's
right to redeem will match the fund manager's right to "book" his fee. So
it is possible for hedge fund managers to earn significant performance
fees even when their investors lose money. This is not true for private
equity fund managers. For them to earn a carried interest the overall
performance of the portfolio, as determined by actual amounts
distributed (not simply a "mark to market" calculation at some arbitrary
date), must show a profit (indeed, under most private equity fund terms,
the return on the fund's investments must exceed a hurdle rate before
carried interest is paid).
On the other hand, private equity firms generally have the benefit of
much longer-term capital, and consequently a much less risky fee stream.
Their investors do not have the right to redeem their interests until the
specified termination date of the partnership, usually twelve years out.
Until recently, hedge fund managers traditionally provided quarterly
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liquidity to their investors. 3 As has been seen with some frequency, a
hedge fund manager can go out of business in a matter of months (if not
hours in particularly calamitous circumstances).' Private equity fund
managers know once they raise a fund, they will at least have a
management fee coming in for years to come.
To use a simple example of a "two and twenty" arrangement in a
private equity fund, if a private equity fund manager manages a private
equity fund with total committed capital of $I billion, and that fund
invests that capital in a series of portfolio companies which ultimately,
over the course of the fund's life, are sold for net proceeds of $3 billion,
the private equity fund manager would be entitled to receive a
management fee of around $20 million per year during the investment
period (typically the fee begins to decline once the specified investment
period is over), and a carried interest of $400 million (ignoring the effect
of management fees and other partnership expenses and taking a simple
calculation of $3 billion of net proceeds less $I billion invested as the
amount of the partnership's profits).
The 2% management fee paid each year is treated as compensation
under U.S. tax law and, absent use of the deferred compensation rules,
would be taxable once earned as ordinary income. Like the hedge fund
manager, a private equity fund manager may defer taxation of the annual
management fee, usually reinvesting it into the fund's portfolio and
recognizing the income at the time the underlying investment is
harvested.5 So, like the hedge fund manager, the private equity fund
manager has the chance to take an interest-free loan from the
government equal to the tax he would otherwise have owed, and invest
and compound it tax free, paying tax only once the fee is paid out as part
of the proceeds from the portfolio investment.
In addition to this deferral opportunity, the private equity manager
receives another tax benefit that has been the principal subject of the
recent call for legislative change. 6 Because a private equity fund
manager's carried interest is structured as a partnership interest, it comes
53. Ironically, one response to the SEC's attempt to compel hedge fund managers to register as
investment advisers was a shift from quarterly to two-year lock-ups which would have allowed hedge
funds to escape the registration requirement. See Gregory Zuckerman & Ian McDonald, Hedge Funds
Avoid SEC Registration Rule; Some Big Firms Change Lockups, Stop Accepting New Investments to
Take Advantage of Loopholes, WALL ST. J., Nov. tO, 2005, at Ci. More recently, higher performing
firms have been able to impose longer lock-up periods as a cost of entry for new investors. See, e.g., All
Hedge Funds: Locked-Up, THE EcoNoMIsT, Aug. 4, 2007, § Finance & Economics.
54. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hard Lesson on Running Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. t9,
2oo8, at Ci, C5 ("Wall Street is going to be littered with such flameouts.").
55. Some managers have attempted various techniques to both defer and convert to capital gains
a portion of these management fees by essentially taking additional carried interest in lieu of
management fees. See Fleischer, supra note t, at I7.
56. See supra notes 7-I and accompanying text.
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with the tax attributes of the underlying transaction. 7 In other words,
because a carried interest represents a share of what are usually long-
term capital gains, it retains this character in the hands of the manager.
So even though the carried interest is indeed being "paid" to the private
equity manager as compensation for his services as the investment
manager for the fund, the manager pays tax on this reward as if it were
capital gains. At current marginal rates that difference translates into a
difference of at least twenty percentage points. So, in our example, rather
than paying $140 million of tax on his carried interest (35% of $400
million), our private equity manager pays $60 million (i5% of $400
million). This spread is the source of revenue (and "unfairness") that has
attracted so much attention recently.
D. CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
A corporate executive is an employee of a company who in a sense is
engaged in an economic function comparable to the hedge and private
equity fund managers. She is a manager of assets. Particularly if we focus
on senior management, such as chief executive officers (CEOs), the
analogy is a common one. Like the portfolio managers in the hedge fund
and private equity businesses, a CEO is meaningfully viewed as the
manager of a portfolio of assets and liabilities. Similarly, we often speak
of her compensation in terms of the size of the enterprise under
management and in terms of a participation in the upside she oversees.
And so analogous to the management fee and performance fee/carried
interest dichotomy, we see our CEO receiving a combination of salary
and relatively fixed bonus paid in cash and incentive or performance-
based compensation paid in equity (e.g., restricted stock awards or stock
options). We also see the use of deferral.
Like the hedge fund and private equity managers, the corporate
executive can elect to defer compensation under the current U.S. tax
regime." As to cash compensation, as others have pointed out,59 there is
little benefit to electing deferral unless an executive is expecting her tax
rates to drop in the future. 6° Where deferral is an important benefit is in
the case of equity-based compensation.
57. See LEVIN, supra note 44, iooi.1, at 1o-3 to io-9.
58. Id. 602, at 6-37 to 6-74.
59. See Eric D. Chanson, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree in Its
Proper Season, 67 OHIO. ST. L.J. 2, 2-4 (2oo6); Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation
of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 571-74 (2007).
6o. Beyond the limited financial benefit of deferring cash compensation, deferral of cash also
imposes additional risk on the manager. See Sanchirico, supra note 1i, at 1152; see also Yale & Polsky,
supra note 59, at 572-74. The deferral rules generally require the person deferring to have only a
general creditor's claim against her employer for the amount deferred. In other words, the deferred
amount needs to be at risk of bankruptcy. So given the limited benefit of deferring cash payments and
the risk of loss, it would seem unlikely that deferral is a meaningful benefit outside of the equity-based
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If a company wishes to pay its CEO through the grant of stock
options, in the usual case there is no tax triggered upon grant of the
option.6 ' This is because the option itself is seen as having no value
(although this is not economically correct)62 because the exercise price at
grant will typically equal the current market price (thus there is no
money to be made today if the option is exercised). 6' Tax will be
triggered only if and when the CEO exercises the option. 6' Then she will
have ordinary income equal to the difference between the exercise price
and the market value of the stock.6 5 So, for example, if we had a company
with a total market value of $i billion and we granted our CEO an
option on 20% of the equity at an exercise price of $200 million (sounds
rich but not dissimilar to the "twenty" deal we gave our two fund
managers), if the market value of the company grows to $1.2 billion
(after giving effect to the exercise) and the CEO exercises her options,
she would own stock worth $240 million having paid an exercise price of
$200 million. She would now owe tax on the $40 million of profit payable
at the ordinary income rate.66 This was the classic structure for equity-
based compensation for corporate executives.
Recently, however, stock options have fallen out of favor as a
compensation device because of their "upside only" character.67 Unlike a
true equity stake, where an investor not only benefits from a growth in
value but suffers from any loss, options incentivize managers to focus
solely on the upside, perhaps at the expense of managing risk.68 In place
compensation situation. The risk of bankruptcy, while important with respect to cash compensation,
does not impose a greater risk in the case of deferred equity compensation. Any compensation whose
value is tied to the firm's equity value is by definition already subject to bankruptcy risk.
61. See LEVIN, supra note 44, 408.1, at 4-46 to 4-47.
62. As Black-Scholes tells us, the option itself even if not "in the money" today is valuable as long
as it remains unexpired. The chance that it will sometime before expiration become "in the money" is
worth something. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 231-5I (1993) (discussing the Black-Scholes model).
63. This was the problem with option backdating. By setting a date were the market value was
lower than the date of grant, thus setting the exercise price so that the option was "in the money,"
issuers were giving income (nothing inherently wrong with that since they could have given cash
bonuses) but were failing to book this expense because they treated them as "no money" options.
64. See LEVIN, supra note 44, 4o8.1 at 4-46 to 4-47.
65. Id.
66. This may explain why so many CEOs want to turn their companies into private equity
investments. Although not the same as the fund manager's carried interest, managers of private equity
portfolio companies have an opportunity to have their equity-based compensation be taxed as capital
gains rather than ordinary income. See Sanchirico, supra note Is, at 1075.
67. See, e.g., Carolyn Said, Companies Reassess Stock Option Grants, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2006,
at FI.
68. Of course the Enron debacle is the poster child for how this dynamic can play out. There is a
lively academic debate over the use of stock options as compensation. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CH. L.
REV. 751 (2002) (arguing that stock options are not optimal arrangement for maximizing shareholder
wealth but result rather from the exercise of managerial power); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining
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of options, more and more boards are looking to grants of restricted
stock as a better device for tying management's interests with
shareholders. The way a restricted stock award generally works is that a
manager is granted a number of shares subject to some form of vesting
regime. While you can find every variety imaginable, generally vesting is
tied to either or both of time or specified performance criteria. If the
vesting requirement is met, the stock belongs to the manager. If not, it is
forfeited.
Using our previous example, if we wanted to provide our CEO the
same $40 million outcome, we would have granted her restricted stock
equal to 3% of the company (3% of $1.2 billion is $40 million). The
problem with doing so, however, is that the minute we granted the stock
she would have had taxable income of $30 million (3% of the $i billion
in market value at grant, ignoring any arguments for discount in value
based upon illiquidity, etc.). So she would have to pay $10.5 million in tax
(a cash outlay) in order to receive the equity-based incentive. You can
imagine why this may not be attractive.6 So what the tax rules permit is
again to defer the recognition of income and the tax.
Instead of recognizing income at the time of the stock grant, our
CEO can treat the grant as a deferred compensation arrangement and
elect to receive the value of the shares at some future date.7" When the
deferred stock or their value is ultimately paid out, the CEO will have
ordinary income equal to the value paid on that future date.
E. COMPARING THE TYPES
It is meaningful to compare the compensation arrangements of our
managerial types-hedge fund manager, private equity fund manager,
and corporate executive-with the benchmark types of wage earner and
entrepreneur for two primary reasons. First, much of the discourse on
the taxation of hedge fund and private equity fund managers relies on an
analogy to the tax treatment of one of the other types." So, defenders of
Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CH. L.
REV. 847, 851-55 (2002) (disputing managerial power thesis and arguing that stock options are over
used because they are mispriced by both employers and managers).
69. Although, if you truly believe in the potential return on the stock, it actually is a good deal
since you would be entitled to capital gains treatment on any appreciation.
70. See LEVIN, supra note 44, 602 at 6-37 to 6-74.
71. Much of both Professor Sanchirico and Professor Weisbach's discussion is an analysis of the
validity of the analogy between private equity managers and entrepreneurs. See Sanchirico, supra note
II, at 1135-39; Weisbach, supra note itI, at 717. Professor Sanchirico makes the point that the analogy
fails because the real source of tax advantage in the private equity context lies in the tax-exempt status
of the majority of private equity limited partners, whereas the "sweat equity" story is "a single actor
tax play," which does not rely on the differing tax rates that give rise to the tax rate arbitrage
opportunity that private equity managers are exploiting. Sanchirico, supra note i1, at io79-8o.
Professor Weisbach concludes that the analogy of a private equity investor to an entrepreneur is as
compelling as the analogy to a wage earner and that therefore "the problem is which one to choose."
[Vol. 6o:27
MEASURING THE TAX SUBSIDY
the current taxation of hedge fund managers and their use of deferral
point to the treatment of corporate executives, arguing that there should
be no difference between them. Similarly, the defenders of the taxation
of private equity fund manager's point to the long-term capital gains
treatment of entrepreneurs and other "capitalists" and argue again that
there are no grounds for treating them differently. Since so much of the
discourse relies on these comparisons, we believe it is useful and
important to consider them ourselves. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, each of these activities are in a very real sense variations on
a theme. The theme is the management of assets. At a fundamental level
each of our types are being paid for their services as asset managers.
Admittedly the skills required among the four types do differ. A
successful hedge fund manager may well fail as an entrepreneur. An
entrepreneur may be a poor corporate executive. And so on. While this
is true, at least at the beginning of a career, these managerial types are
drawing on a common labor pool. It is not at all trivial to say that a first-
year MBA student is equally a potential hedge fund manager, private
equity fund manager, corporate executive, entrepreneur, or wage earner.
Therefore, it is meaningful to determine whether our tax laws make it
cheaper to pay one type over the other.
II. THE MODEL
To answer the question of how and to what extent the tax laws
subsidize these different managerial compensation arrangements, we
have developed a model that allows us to compare the types. To do so,
we treat each of our compensation schemes as a kind of security or
investment contract. By doing so, we can compare on an "apples to
apples" basis the economics of each, and the impact of differing tax
regimes, by valuing each type employing established financial analytics.
As we discuss below, each of the types can be described as a form of call
option.
A. WAGE EARNER
The wage earner provides our benchmark case for "unsubsidized"
compensation. He receives his pay up front, it is immediately recognized
as income and is immediately taxed at the ordinary income rate. To allow
us to make the "apples to apples" comparison with the four types of
managerial compensation schemes, we assume the wage earner reinvests
his net earnings (after paying the tax) in equity and describe this
investment as a call option on the market having a nominal strike price.
Weisbach, supra note ii, at 717. Professor Sanchirico has catalogued a long list of various
commentators' use of the "sweat equity" analogy at Sanchirico, supra note ii, at io78.
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Therefore, wage earner's option is assumed to be "in the money" and to
change in value as the value of the market assets change.72
B. ENTREPRENEUR
Our other benchmark case is the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is
assumed to buy a "knock-out" call option on an asset with a significant
idiosyncratic component. By "idiosyncratic" we are referring to the fact
that entrepreneur, unlike wage earner who holds market assets, is
holding an undiversified portfolio and therefore is taking idiosyncratic
risk (i.e., having all her eggs in one basket) as well as market risk. Like
the wage earner, the strike level is nominal. The value of the option will
vary as the value of the firm changes, and an entrepreneur makes money
so long as the value of her firm grows. In order to simulate the risk of
failure (bankruptcy), we impose a "knock-out" level,73 which causes the
option to lapse valueless if the "knock-out" threshold is crossed.
C. EXECUTIVE
The executive is also assumed to buy a call option on an asset with
an idiosyncratic component.7 ' The strike level is again nominal. Like the
entrepreneur, the value of the executive's option varies with the value of
the firm, and the executive will make money if the value of her firm
grows. The idiosyncratic volatility of the executive's asset, however, is
less than that of the entrepreneur's asset. This is because we assume that
the volatility of a more mature, well-established firm is lower than that of
a start-up. Put simply, it is less risky to hold stock in Microsoft than to
hold stock in a start-up software company.
D. PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGER
The private equity manager is assumed to buy a call option on a
portfolio of assets with idiosyncratic components. The strike level is
equal to the initial value of all the assets. Because a carried interest is
only valuable once the private equity fund returns the original
investment of its investors, the strike price on this option is set at the
starting value of the portfolio assets. So, the private equity manager only
72. In essence, this is equivalent to simply making an investment in an index fund that mimics the
performance of the entire market. We set this up as a call option so that we have similar components
in the model across the four types we are comparing.
73. The effect of inserting a "knock-out" feature is to cause the option to expire before its stated
maturity date in the event that the value of the underlying asset falls below the stated "knock-out"
level. This is a convenient way of adding the risk of bankruptcy or firm failure to the analysis. If the
value of the firm or portfolio falls below a certain level, the ability of the option holder to "wait and
see" if the value will recover may, in some cases, be "knocked out" even though the possibility
remains.
74. The investment of an executive in the equity of her employer, like that of an entrepreneur, is
an investment in a single, undiversified asset (again, all her eggs are in one basket), and therefore she
faces idiosyncratic risk. See generally Murphy, supra note 68, at 847-6o.
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begins to make money once the value of the portfolio exceeds the initial
capital (debt and equity) invested. The idiosyncratic volatility of the
private equity asset portfolio benefits from diversification across the
portfolio. In other words, because a private equity fund does not hold all
its eggs in one basket, it is less risky than the entrepreneur's option.
Where the risk lies relative to the market assets (i.e., a fully diversified
portfolio) is open to debate. We run scenarios based on findings in the
existing literature.75
E. HEDGE FUND MANAGER
The hedge fund manager is assumed to buy a series of knock-out call
options on an idiosyncratic asset. Because hedge fund performance fees
are earned annually, each call of the hedge fund manager has only a one-
year life. If, at the end of the year, the option is "in the money," the
spread is taken and invested directly in the asset, and a new option is
purchased for the upcoming year. In addition, because we are assuming a
"market neutral" strategy, the hedge fund manager has a beta of zero
and hence only idiosyncratic risk and return. 6 To simulate the risk of a
fund failure, we impose a "knock-out" level, which, if crossed, causes the
option to lapse valueless. We interpret this "knock-out" level as being
equivalent to the percentage draw down that fund investors will tolerate
before redeeming their interests in a fund."
75. See generally Sanchirico, supra note I I.
76. Since beta is the measure of portfolio risk correlated with the market, a market neutral
strategy which seeks to avoid correlation with the market, has a beta of zero. In real life, few "market
neutral" hedge funds succeed in fully eliminating beta. For our purposes, we simply incorporate any
such volatility into the idiosyncratic risk variables we use in the model.
77. As already noted, an important difference between hedge funds and private equity funds is
the differing degree of liquidity each type of fund offers its investors. Traditionally, most private
equity funds require their investors to commit capital for a period of ten to twelve years. The capital-
weighted average life is shorter since capital is drawn down (as investments are made) and returned
(as investments are harvested) over time. Nevertheless, the legal commitment made at the outset calls
for a long-term, relatively illiquid investment in the fund. As a consequence, private equity fund
managers can be said to operate a relatively low-risk business since they do not face the risk of a
sudden demise of their business by reason of a "run on the bank." To use the industry vernacular, they
have relatively "permanent capital." In contrast, hedge fund managers face a substantially higher risk
of "losing their seat." Until relatively recently, the majority of hedge funds offered their investors
annual and often quarterly redemption rights. See Jasmina Hasanhodzic & Andrew W. Lo, Can
Hedge-Fund Returns Be Replicated?: The Linear Case I- 7 (unpublished draft of Aug. i6, 2oo6),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=924565. This changed, at least among the more successful funds,
to bi-annual redemption because of the recent attempt by the SEC to regulate hedge fund managers.
See SEC STAFF REPORT, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWrH OF HEDGE FUNDS 7-8 (2003). available at
http:www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefundso9o3.pdf. The SEC exempted funds with "lock-up terms of
two years or more in order to leave private equity managers unregulated." Id. Ironically, this attempt
to increase regulation simply caused the hedge fund industry to curtail the liquidity rights it afforded
its investors to avoid regulation. See Said, supra note 67. Nevertheless, hedge fund managers continue
to face a far greater risk of "going out of business" when their performance disappoints their investor
base. In addition, because of so-called "high water mark" provisions, it is actually in a manager's
interest to consider shutting a fund with negative returns and returning capital even when investors
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To make the comparisons, we begin by asking the following two
questions: What are the returns (measured in annual percentage returns
and aggregate dollars) on an equal dollar amount invested in each type
of call option we've described? And what are the risks associated with
each such investment as measured by the standard deviation (measured
in annual percentage variance and aggregate dollars) of those returns?
We begin with a standard linear model for asset returns:
RA = Rf+/A(R,,- Rf) + A + E
Where:
" RA is the asset return;
* Rfis the risk-free rate of return;
* /
3
A is the asset's beta, measuring its correlation to market assets;
* R, is the market return, and therefore (R. - R) is the equity risk
premium;
* aA is the asset's alpha, measuring the non-market component of
return;
* and cis the measure of the asset's idiosyncratic risk and the
associated return.
While it is descriptive of the components of asset returns, this simple
linear model offers little insight. It is too static. Richness comes from
putting this basic description of asset pricing into motion by using a
stochastic process to simulate the range of potential outcomes for an
assumed investment in each of the asset types.7 We do this by using a
standard Monte Carlo simulation.7 ' By analyzing each compensation type
through a simulation of the distribution of probabilistic outcomes, we can
now calculate expected return as the mean of the outcomes in n = 1,ooo
random iterations of each investment, giving us a sample set from which
to observe important secondary characteristics. 8° In developing the
expected return outcomes through a Monte Carlo simulation we can
themselves have not forced a liquidation of the fund through redemption calls. To reflect this risk
faced by hedge fund manager, we have inserted a "knock-out" feature into the call option we model.
We set the "knock-out" level to be equal to the level of fund losses at which a typical fund would shut
down and return capital, either voluntarily or through investor redemptions. This is admittedly a very
arbitrary variable for which we have no empirical foundation. We do test the sensitivity of our
conclusions to changes in our assumed "knock-out" levels below.
78. See infra Table A.
79. See generally JOHN C. HULL, OPnONs, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (7 th ed. 2008)
(discussing Monte Carlo simulation in the context of financial instruments): GEORGE S. FISHMAN,
MONTE CARLO: CONCEPTS, ALGORITHMS, AND APPLICATIONS (1996) (discussing the Monte Carlo
technique in more general circumstances).
80. In addition to the ,ooo basic random iterations of investment simulation, we also use an
additional second set of l,ooo random iterations, for a total of 2,000 iterations. The second set is
constructed by using underlying normal random variables which are antithetic to the first set. This
technique allows us to obtain more precise results by reducing the sampling error associated with a
Monte Carlo simulation.
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reveal and quantify the differing impact of risk by measuring the
standard deviation of the set of outcomes and the impact of any "knock-
out" thresholds on the expected value of each asset type. This in turn will
allow us to make a meaningful comparison of each compensation type
while adjusting for the differing structures and risks associated with each.
In running the Monte Carlo simulations, returns on the "market
asset" are modeled as normally distributed with a mean annual return of
13% and a standard deviation of I6%. s' The idiosyncratic components of
asset returns are also assumed to follow normal distributions, and these
components are assumed to be uncorrelated with the market returns.
Since the return variables are normally distributed, asset values will
follow log-normal distributions. As stated in the model, the mean return
of each asset will have a market component and an excess return
component, and the volatility will have a market component and an
idiosyncratic risk component. In addition, if an asset has a "beta" value
relative to the market other than one, a risk-free rate of 5% is used to
8,compute the market portion of returns.
III. THE RESULTS
The assumptions used in running the simulation are set out below:
TABLE A: MODELING ASSUMPTIONS
IDIOSYNCRATIC "KNOCK- CALL OPTON
TYPE BT a VOLATILITY OUT" STRIKE TERM
(II) (a') (6') LEVEL STRIK_ TER
WAGE EARNER 1.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 5 years"
ENTREPRENEUR 1.9 0% 6o% 50% 0% 5 years
EXECUTIVE 1.0 0% 30% 0% 0% 5 years
PRIVATE 17.32% (60%




HEDGE FUND 90% soo% invested
MANAGER 0.0 I4.59% 15.96% aggregate aggregate in asset
I I_ thereafter
81. A normal standard distribution is completely characterized by its mean and standard
deviation. See generally KAI LAI CHUNG & FARID AITSAHLIA, ELEMENTARY PROBABILITY THEORY (4th ed.
2006) (discussing probability and the normal distribution).
82. See infra Table A.
83. The Wage Earner is assumed to receive a salary payment each year and, after paying ordinary
income taxes on the payment, invest the proceeds in the market for the remainder of the five year
term of the analysis. Thus, the term of each of his investments expires at the end of the five year
window, but there will be a new investment made in each year of the analysis.
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The assumptions for a wage earner are simply driven by our
definition of the "market asset" and commonly used inputs for the
market asset. For entrepreneur, we set the beta level based upon a recent
empirical study of venture capital portfolio companies.8' That study
measured volatility of entrepreneurial companies at 89%."' We instead
use a more optimistic volatility of 6o%, being an apyproximation of the
volatility of a small cap NASDAQ-traded company. The effect of this
change is to narrow the tax subsidy we find for private fund managers.
We also impose a 50% "knock-out" threshold in order to simulate the
risk of going out of business. s At a 50% "knock-out" rate, the failure
rate for the entrepreneur is approximately 30.65%. For the corporate
executive we use a beta of one and idiosyncratic risk of 30%,
approximating the characteristics of a mature, large cap NYSE-traded
company.8 For the private equity fund assets, we take the approach
found in a recent study of private equity fund economics, setting beta as
one (relatively mature, steady cash-flowing businesses) but individual
idiosyncratic risk at 6o% (comparable to the small-cap stock level used
for the entrepreneur). 9 We do not impose a "knock-out" level for either
the corporate executive or the private equity fund manager because of
our assumption that the idiosyncratic risk variable and the structure of
the call option adequately encompass the risks of failure. We do impose
"knock-out" levels in the cases of the entrepreneur and the hedge fund
managers because of the need we perceive to include not only a risk of
failure related solely to the performance of the underlying asset, but also
a risk of failure arising from the "early" termination of the option when
investors "pull the plug" at some level of loss. We believe these are
important nuances to the terms of the entrepreneur and the hedge fund
manager because they do substantially dampen the expected value of
each that derives from the combination of high volatility and the
leverage inherent in the option structure. Finally, for the hedge fund
assets, we used the data on a sample of long/short equity funds from a
recent study of hedge fund returns to set alpha at 14.59% and
idiosyncratic volatility at I5.96%; ° we assume such funds are "market
84. John H. Cochrane, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, 75 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 19 (2005).
85. Id. at 18.
86. Turan G. Bali & Nusret Cakici, Idiosyncratic Volatility and the Cross Section of Expected
Returns, 43 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 29, 41-42 (reporting that the range of idiosyncratic volatility
and betas for all stocks traded over a twenty-year period on the major exchanges range from a
volatility of 15.87% per annum and a beta of o.6o for the highest quintile to a volatility of 95.69% and
a beta of 1.14 for the lowest). In picking our inputs, we used values that were not set at the two
extremes, but approximated the second and fourth quintiles.
87. The Cochrane study found a failure rate of 9% among its sample. Id.
88. See supra Table A; see also supra notes 86-88.
89. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 52, at i9-2o; see also, Knoll, supra note II, at I3-18 (using the
same attributes to calculate likely tax revenues from a change in the taxation of carried interests).
90. See Hasanhodzic & Lo, supra note 77, at 24.
[Vol. 6o:27
November 2008] MEASURING THE TAX SUBSIDY
neutral" and therefore use a beta of zero. We assume a "knock-out"
level of 9o%, implying a tolerance by investors for drawdowns of up to
IO%.
These inputs generate the following results:
TABLE B: FIVE-YEAR EXPECTED RETURN MULTIPLES AND STANDARD
DEVIATION OF RETURNS 91
TYPE EXPECTED RETURN STANDARD DEVIATION







To express these results in annual terms, we calculate the geometric
annual returns as follows:
TABLE C: ANNUALIZED EXPECTED PERCENTAGE RETURNS AND
STANDARD DEVIATIONS
TYPE EXPECTED RETURN STANDARD DEVIATION
WAGE EARNER 0.77% 4.57%
ENTREPRENEUR 3.66% 75.85%
EXECUTIVE 5.76% 16.45%
PRIVATE EQUITY io.66% 45.J8%
MANAGER
HEDGE FUND 26.29% 37.45%
MANAGER
In judging the reasonableness of these simulated results, we note
that both the hedge fund manager and private equity manager have
"leveraged" positions relative to the returns of the underlying portfolio
assets (in other words, they hold options). We also note that all returns
are calculated giving effect to current tax regimes. Therefore, for
example, wage earner expected returns are calculated after deducting an
upfront tax of 35%, and corporate executive expected returns are
calculated after deducting a 35% tax paid at the end of the five-year
91. These return multiples represent the full, final after tax return to the investor per dollar
invested, including any return of the amount originally invested.
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period. The annualized geometric returns for the underlying portfolios in
our simulation (in other words the gross returns enjoyed by the investors
in the funds, which returns are comparable to the ones more commonly
reported for these types of investments) are 14.57% for private equity
funds, and 22.04% for hedge funds. The standard deviations of these
returns were 12.22% for private equity funds, and 9.09% for hedge
funds. In our simulation, hedge funds substantially outperformed the
market with comparable risk; private equity firms outperformed the
market but with higher risk.
We also note that while the entrepreneur has a very low annualized
rate of return, he nevertheless has a very high five-year expected return
in dollar terms. While this may appear peculiar initially, the outcome is
intuitive. In any given year, an entrepreneur faces a low expectation of
return given the enormous volatility and "knock-out" risks he faces.
However, over time, that same volatility offers increasingly outsized
potential rewards, which begin to overwhelm the risks in determining
expected value. In other words, to take big risks, the entrepreneur must
have the possibility (however small) of relatively enormous outcomes in
the end. Despite the relatively low probability of success, the size of
opportunity generates a large expected value (just a very risky one).
Having made these calculations, we are now in a position to
compare on an "apples to apples" basis the managerial compensation
types by benchmarking them against the wage earner and the
entrepreneur, and to measure the impact of taxes. As noted above, these
results were calculated imposing the taxes payable under the current
regime. This current regime of taxation is summarized below:
TABLE D: TAX ASSUMPTIONS (UNDER CURRENT LAW)




WAGE EARNER 35% 15% 0%
ENTREPRENEUR 0% 0% 15%
EXECUTIVE 0% 0% 35%
PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGER 0% 0% 15%
HEDGE FUND MANAGER 0% 0% 35%93
92. The column "Tax on Gains Above Initial Amount Received" represents a tax on gain
amounts only, with no tax deduction for losses.
93. In fact, the actual rate paid by hedge fund managers on "deferral" brought into income is
probably lower. First, there may be planning opportunities within the hedge fund structure to allocate
gains and losses among various investors so as to allocate long-term capital gains to the manager and
ordinary income or short-term capital gains to offshore or tax-exempt investors. Second, hedge fund
managers can defer income for much longer than five years. The longer term would increase the value
of their option. Thus, it may be that our calculation understates the level of tax subsidy enjoyed by the
hedge fund manager.
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To measure the effect of taxes, we ran the model again using a
second tax regime. The second scenarios applied a regime where all
managerial compensation types (other than entrepreneur) were taxed in
the same manner as wage earner compensation. This tax regime is
summarized below:
TABLE E: TAX ASSUMPTIONS (UNDER PROPOSED REVISION)
TAX ON GAIN ABOVE INITIAL TAX ON FINAL
TYPE INITIAL TAX AMOUNT RECEIVED AMOUNT
WAGE EARNER 35% 15% 0%
ENTREPRENEUR 0% 0% 15%
EXECUTIVE 35% 15% 0%
PRIVATE EQUITY
MANAGER 35% 15% 
0%
HEDGE FUND 35 %  35% annual tax on earned 0%
MANAGER amounts
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94. The column "Tax on Gains above Initial Amount Received" represents a tax on gain amounts
only with no tax deduction for losses.
95. The vertical axis on the graph measures full final after tax return to the investor per dollar
invested, including any return of the amount originally invested. The horizontal axis measures the
standard deviation of this return amount.
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In Figure i, the dark line represents the frontier formed as one
substitutes wage earner compensation for entrepreneur. Since each of
these choices is taken as a given value under current tax policy and as the
points of comparison for discussing other forms of compensation, we
define this frontier as the "policy line." In other words, it is the line that
the current taxation of these two archetypal forms of compensation
defines as the risk/reward benchmark. If other types of compensation
offer a different risk/reward trade-off than one achievable through a
blending of these two types (such potential blending being represented
by the points lying on this line), we can say that that type is more or less
attractive relative to the other types. To the extent taxes affect that
difference, we can then talk about and measure a "tax subsidy."
We can examine the same comparisons looking at the annualized
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As each of these sets of results shows, as currently taxed, both
private equity fund and hedge fund managers enjoy a risk/reward
proposition that is superior to the "policy line." Interestingly, as
96. The vertical axis on the graph measures the annualized compounded percentage return
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currently taxed, the opportunity to earn compensation in the form of a
nonqualified deferred restricted stock award falls very close to the policy
line, suggesting that that tax rule does satisfy the notion of parity among
types. The private equity fund managers enjoy a compound average
after-tax return that is 8.2 percentage points higher per year than the
after-tax return to the combination of entrepreneur and employee
activities having the same level of risk.' The edge enjoyed by a hedge
fund manager is even higher, at 24.1 percentage points per year9 If the
tax rate on carried interests of private fund managers were increased
from a 15% capital gains rate to a 35% ordinary income rate, and if the
tax were payable at the time of grant, rather than in the future, the edge
enjoyed by the managers would decrease, ceteris paribus, to 0.4
percentage points for private equity managers and to 19.2 percentage
points for hedge fund managers.' Thus, taxes may account for as much as
95%, or nearly all, of the excess returns enjoyed by private equity
managers, and as much as 20% of the excess returns enjoyed by hedge
fund managers."
IV. ROBUSTNESS
An appropriate objection to our conclusions generally, and to any
attempt to calculate a precise amount of subsidy in particular, is that our
conclusions are highly dependent on the inputs we use in our model.
Obviously if we are measuring the distance between points on a graph
97. We calculate that the compound average annual return to a private equity manager is 10.7%
per year, with a risk of 45.2%. An individual who spends approximately 59% of his time engaged in
entrepreneurial activities and the remaining 41% of his time as an ordinary wage earner has the same
level of risk but an expected return of only 2.5%, or 8.2 percentage points less than that of the private
equity manager. All averages and risks are computed for geometric returns that compound over a
period of five years.
98. We calculate that the compound average annual return to a hedge fund manager is 26.3% per
year, with a risk of 37.5%. An individual who spends approximately 49% of his time engaged in
entrepreneurial activities and the remaining 5I% of his time as an ordinary wage earner has the same
level of risk but an expected return of only 2.2%, or 24.1 percentage points less than that of the private
equity manager. All averages and risks are computed for geometric returns that compound over a
period of five years.
99. This calculation assumes that the entire impact of the tax change would be borne by the fund
managers and that no correlative change in salary paid by the limited partner investors would occur.
For the calculations under the revised tax, the compound average annual return to the private equity
manager is 2.7%, with a risk of 41.5%, and the average annual return to the hedge fund manager is
21.3%, with a risk of 35.5%. The corresponding return levels for a combination of entrepreneurial and
wage-earner activities with the matching risk levels are 2.3% and 2.1 %, respectively. All averages and
risks are computed for geometric returns that compound over a period of five years.
ioo. For private equity managers, the percentage is computed as the percentage reduction from an
excess return of 8.2 percentage points to an excess return of 0.4 percentage points. For hedge fund
managers, the percentage is computed as the percentage reduction from an excess return of 24.1
percentage points to an excess return of 19.2 percentage points. Both of these results require the




and drawing conclusions from those measurements, it is enormously
important that the positions of the various points be correct, if not
absolutely, then at least relatively. While, as we explained above, we
have attempted to define each relevant point based upon empirically
compelling assumptions, none of the assumptions we use is without
uncertainty. Therefore, the best we can say about the precise numerical
conclusions we reach regarding the size of the tax subsidy enjoyed by
private equity and hedge fund managers is that they are reasonable
estimates of their order of magnitude.
We can, however, be more definitive about the general conclusion
that a subsidy does in fact exist. To make this assertion we simply need to
establish that the relative position of the private equity and hedge fund
manager types is superior (i.e., falls above the line) to the other types
under a broad range of assumptions. If this finding holds true under all
plausible conditions-using ranges of modeling inputs that encompass
most any description of the world, then our conclusion is robust.
To test for this form of robustness, we used the following range of
modeling inputs:
TABLE F: ROBUSTNESS TESTING INPUTS
IDIOSYNCRATIC
TYPE 6ET VOLATILITY "KNOCK-OUT" LEVEL
() (a)(6)
ENTREPRENEUR 1.5 to n/a 6o% to 90% 30% to 70%
4._
EXECUTIVE n/a n/a 30% to 6o% n/a
PRIVATE o.6 to 40% to 6o% per asset/EQUITY 0. o n/an/
MANAGE 2.0 12 uncorrelated assets
MANAGER
HEDGE FUND 12% toMENGE n/a 8% 13% to 19% 85% to 95% aggregateMANAGER 18%
These ranges encompass the range of values for beta, alpha and
idiosyncratic volatility we have found in the literature on these various
types of investments. For "knock-out" level assumptions for the
entrepreneur, we selected a range of levels that translate into a firm
failure rate that range from 14.3% to 59.5%."'O For robustness testing
purposes, the key is the lower end of the range we selected. As failure
rates increase, we are only shifting the policy line further away from the
other types. By adding the possibility of a failure rate as low as i6.6%,
we are moving the range of potential outcomes for the entrepreneur
much farther toward the other points than we suspect most observers
ioi. Assuming a constant beta of 1.9 and idiosyncratic volatility of 6o%.
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would see as realistic.'02 For "knock-out" level assumptions for the hedge
fund, we selected rates that translate into investor tolerance for up to a
5% loss of capital.
Using these ranges of inputs, we then ran the model again to
determine the range of outcomes and their relative positioning. The
outcome of this robustness testing can be seen by displaying the "clouds"
of potential outcomes these ranges of inputs produce. The results are
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102. Estimates of failure rates among entrepreneurial companies vary greatly. See, e.g., Cochrane,
supra note 84, at 8 (finding that 8.9% of companies in a large sample of venture-backed companies go
out of business); Mark Henricks, Think Your Startup's Destined to Fail?, ENTREPRaNEUR MAG., Feb.
2007, at 22 (reporting that the popularly believed statistic of a 9o% failure rate among new businesses
is unsubstantiated and that the best evidence available shows that a majority of new businesses are still
in business four years after their founding).
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These outcomes can be seen even more clearly if we scale the graph
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The results portrayed in these pictures illustrate that throughout
virtually the entire range of inputs described above, the risk/reward
proposition for the hedge fund manager and the private equity fund
manager is superior to the complete range of outcomes available to
either a wage earner or an entrepreneur. We note that only by subjecting
private equity and hedge fund managers to a tax regime comparable to
that applicable to an ordinary wage earner do we bring their results close
to the "policy line" and then only at the extreme margin. Interestingly,
the risk/reward proposition of the corporate executive's equity
compensation package falls close to the "policy line," albeit at the upper
end.
These outcomes suggest to us that our general conclusion is robust-
private equity and hedge fund managers do enjoy a tax subsidy.' 3
CONCLUSION
While the precise amount of additional tax required to eliminate the
subsidy enjoyed by private fund managers is highly dependent on the
103. Readers are invited to visit the website, http://www.tbrenn.net/rtm, where they can find a copy
of the model used in this Article's analysis, color versions of the graphs, and the ability to change the
various inputs in order to explore the robustness of our results.
[Vol. 6o:27
November 20081 MEASURING THE TAX SUBSIDY 59
inputs used in our model, the overall direction of the analysis is clear.
Wage earners, entrepreneurs, corporate executives, private equity fund
managers and hedge fund managers are each offered an opportunity to
convert their human capital into wealth. What differs among them is the
nature of the different investment opportunities -the risks and
rewards-they have before them, and the way each of these different
compensation schemes is taxed. Adjusting for the differing risk and
return characteristics of each type of compensation, under a broad range
of modeling inputs, we find that private equity fund and hedge fund
managers enjoy risk/reward propositions that are superior to wage
earners, corporate executives, and entrepreneurs. A significant part of
that superiority comes from tax.
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